Risk analysis of GM crop technology in China: modeling and governance by JIN HONG et al.
Risk analysis of GM crop technology in China:
modeling and governance
Abstract
This paper aims at analyzing risks management of genetically modified
(GM) crop technology in China, including risk classification, risk generating
mechanisms and its governance. Firstly, we seek to create a three-dimensional
model capable of assessing the risks of GM crop technologies. Based on this
model, the risks of GM crop technologies can be divided into eight types,
depending on the high or low risks levels associated with social hazard,
technology uncertainty and economic harm. China’s GM technology is cur-
rently located in the high risk zone of this model, particularly in the market of
GM soybean. In order to tackle this risk, the article introduces the Actor-Net-
work Theory (ANT) as a useful tool to explore its risk assessment and gover-
nance. Lastly, we suggest the Chinese government needs to construct an effi-
cient governance mechanism which should be able to balance actors’ interests
and reduce or avoid risks induced by GM crop technologies.
INTRODUCTION
The development of the world’s agriculture has so far experiencedtwo green revolutions. The first started in the 1940s and was aimed
at changing the seeds while the second is the agricultural technology
revolution focused on GM crop technology which appears to be do-
minating the 21st century. However, the discourses of opponents to
GM crop technology in scientific and public communities are ex-
tending over a whole range from environmentalists (Lövei and Arpaia,
2005), social economists (Hubbard, 2009), health workers (Domingo,
2007; Then and Potthof, 2009) to ethicists (Jensen and Sandoe, 2002).
Many of these critical discourses focus on the uncertainty of GM
technology and its potential risk on human being and environment
(Levidow et al., 2005; Myhr and Traavik, 2003).
In fact the development of GM crop technology faces a dilemma. On
the one hand it is aimed at delivering economic, social and environ-
mental benefits, but on the other hand it may be threatening to the
ecology, human health and social security. According to the dilemma
towards GM crop technology, there are two hot research topics: the
discussion of its potential or/and actual risks and the approaches of its
risk management. From public attitudes’ perspective, it is examined
public policy attitudes towards GM technology (Paarlberg, 2000). But
the reactions of public to GM food vary widely, including positive and
negative cognition as well as positive and negative affect (feelings)
(Siegrist, 2000; Cook, Kerr and Moore 2002; Liver et al., 2005; Sjöberg,





1 School of Management,
University of Science and
Technology of China.
NO.96 Jinzhai Road, Hefei City,
Anhui Province, China, 230026
2 Curtin University Sustainability
Policy (CUSP) Institute
Curtin University, 3 Pakenham Street




University of Science and
Technology of China, Room 216, MBA
Center Building, South Campus
NO. 1129 Huizhou Road, Hefei City
Anhui Province, 230051, China
E-mail: zeroyu@mail.ustc.edu.cn (W.T. Yu)
Key words: Genetically modified;
GM crop technology; risk management;
three-dimension model; actor-network theory
Received July 17, 2013.
PERIODICUM BIOLOGORUM UDC 57:61
VOL. 115, No 3, 307–316, 2013 CODEN PDBIAD
ISSN 0031-5362
Science policy
different risk impact on social and economic system.
Certainly, the various attitudes also lead to different ac-
tions in practice. The companies and authorizations by
decision-makers suppose GM technology to be com-
mercialized for its absence of health risks or nutritional
equivalence serve (Huang et al., 2005), while the envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
oppose it. Recently, the commercialization of GM crops
has been a focus of attention in relation to consumers’
information rights, property rights problems and ethical
questions, which is related to the integrity of research
and the objectivity of scientists (Diels, 2011). GM crop
technology itself is indeed uncertain at different levels:
technical uncertainty, epistemological uncertainty, (e.g.,
limited knowledge concerning properties of the GM pro-
duction in question), and methodological uncertainty
(Myhr and Traavik, 2003). Maybe the scientific uncer-
tainty concerning the GM plant utilization impedes con-
sensus on terminology from value differences between
proponents and opponents of GM crop technology (Clark
and Lehman, 2001; Costa-Font et al., 2008).
In this context, there are a lot of measures proposed to
GM risks governance. Freestone and Hey (1996) provide
the Precautionary Principle (PP) to manage scientific
uncertainty. Now the PP has been accepted by many
national governments as a basis for policymaking, and it
has also become important principle in international
environmental laws and international treaties (EU, 2000).
But in the view of opponents, the PP represents a non-
-scientific attitude that causes trade hindrance (Adler,
2000), and inhibits technology development as well as
economic benefits (Miller and Conko, 2000). As a result,
Rogers (2001) argues the risk associated with GM crop
technology is divided into high, medium and low levels
of uncertainties. The risk governance concerning high
uncertainty should take preventive strategy while the
latter two levels should apply PP strategy, such as in-
creasing transparency or collecting more information.
Furthermore, Cockburn (2002) applies a comparative
approach to analyze the safety between the GM products
and traditional crops. It is also argued GM food risk event
is presented to the public as a new hazard occurring in a
crisis context (Frewer et al., 2002). Consequently, they
apply social amplification of risk framework, which is
proposed to explain why risk events with minor physical
consequences often elicit strong public concern and pro-
duce extraordinarily server social impacts (Kasperson et
al., 1988), to explain the potential impact on risk percep-
tions of GM food risk event. From label management
perspective, it is suggested GM-food labels on bidding
behavior of participants in an experimental auction (Huf-
fman et al., 2003, 2007), while Rousu et al. (2004) develop
a methodology to value the contribution of third-party
information in a setting with conflicted information.
Recently, the risk governance of GM food is enhanced by
the application of science and technology studies, and
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) in particular (Bryn and
Janice 2002; Bled 2010). In their research, however, ANT
is only used as a tool to analyze the ethical problem or
environmental negotiation of GM technology. As a matter
of fact, ANT is a useful theory framework to explore the
GM technological choice and its risk governance.
Based on above literature review, research on the risk
governance of GM crop technology includes not only
micro-management, but also analysis from the perspec-
tives of different disciplines. However, little research has
conducted studies on the risks management associated
with GM crop technology through constructing assess-
ment models or frameworks. In particularly, it sorely lacks
of multi-level perspective to analyse the GM uncertainties.
In this study, we attempt to explore the risks governance of
GM crop technology by establishing an innovative model
of three dimensions for risk management with multi-level
viewpoint. The three-dimensional model can analyze so-
cial risk, technology risk and economic risk at the same
time. In order to address the practical reality of GM food
risk in China, particularly in the market of China's GM
soybean, we have also applied the actor-network theory to
explore its risk governance. In this study, the GM risk
governance has been an active area of research and the
contribution is the establishment of an innovative three-
-dimensional model and actor-network theory application.
THEORY AND MODELING
The GM crop technology refers to the recombinant
DNA technology which can transfer external DNA from
one crop to another and hence achieve a new technology
with new characteristics. This technology has advantages
of decreasing the usage of chemicals and fertilizers and at
the same time increasing the agricultural production
(Zhang et al., 2002). However, according to Rønning et al.
(2003), there are many potential risks associated with GM
crop technology, including unexpected concentrations
and repetitive sequences of the exogenous genes. In spite
of different risks (including social risk, technology risk and
economic risk), we use the degree of risk as a whole to
depute its risk in this research, which is related with three
dimensions: social hazard, technology uncertainty and
economic harm. First, despite continue development of
GM crop technology, the risks caused by the uncertainties
are also gradually socialized every day. Hence, the re-
searchers must consider the level of social hazard (in-
cluding actual and psychological hazard) and public res-
ponse during their R&D and promotion of the GM crop
technology. Second, according to Roger’s (2001) Harm =
f(Hazard) model, the harm brought by the GM tech-
nology risks is definite (i.e. the risk is constant), but the
functional relationship is indefinite. In other words, GM
technologies themselves are indeed uncertain at different
level (e.g. with low or high uncertainty), which may cause
the technology risk. Third, if the economic value cannot
compensate for the damage inflicted on human health,
resources, environment and social security, society should
have enough reason to reject this type of technology
(James et al., 2003). Therefore, the GM technology risks
are also linked to economic benefits or harm and generally
the higher of economic harm from the GM technology the
higher of its risks.
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The three dimensions, social hazard, technology un-
certainty and economic harm, is used to assess the risk
associated with GM crop technology (see Figure 1). Social
hazard can be actual and/or perceived and is linked to
implications related to human health, resources, envi-
ronment and social stability during marketization. For
instance, the GM plants may result in unmanageable
weeding and then produce serious bad impacts on the
ecosystems, including animals, fungi and bacteria. If people
eats the GM food, it may cause detrimental effects on hu-
man being health (Domingo, 2007; Then and Potthof,
2009). If the problem of environment and human health is
indeed serious, the social hazard will be obviously high
and produce big risk. If the social hazard is under human
control, it shows the social risk of GM crop is not big
problem. Here, we propose that this dimension is the most
important factor for the whole GM crop technology risk in
the model. Technology uncertainty is related with these
issues such as technology content, scale, range/sphere of
influence, patenting and other research conditions. Ge-
nerally, higher uncertainty is expected to bring higher risks
and vice versa.
The third dimension represents the economic harm on
GM crop technology. There are two kinds of economic
harms or costs caused by investment in GM technology,
including enterprise and social or environmental costs. We
assume the economic revenues received from GM crops in
time t to be TRt, CCt deputes the enterprise cost, CUt
deputes environmental and social cost that is unknown
with a probability of Pt, the discount factor is Dt=1/(1+r)t,
where r is the social rate of time preference. Then the
economic profits of GM crop technology can be repre-
sented by: SDt(TRt-CCt-Pt ´ CUt). The public decision-
-making about GM crop technology depends on a positive
value of the profit (James et al., 2003). Those countries
who own low or none of economic profits from the deve-
lopment of GM technology will do not take positive policy
to support it. The economic harm is taken into the model
as the third dimension to reflect GM crop technology risk.
These three dimensions with different fit in high or low
level can be demonstrate the risk degree of GM crop tech-
nology (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Notablely, it is
potentially assumed that the social hazard, technology un-
certainty and economic harm are dependent each other in
the three-dimensional model. If the three dimensions are
correlated with each other, it may lead to the boundaries of
eight types of GM technology risks blurred.
There are 8 types of risks (Table 1). First, the social ha-
zards (SH) of GM crop technology are characterized by
broad deep and irreversible, which means that this di-
mension plays a decisive role in the model. In other words,
if the social hazard is higher the degree of risk is bigger
regardless of other two dimensions. Second, the techno-
logy uncertainty (TU) of GM crop can create risks mani-
fested through social and environmental hazard, which
plays the second important role in deciding the degree of
risk. The GM technology economic harm (EH) does not
cause environmental harm directly but can also play a
strong coordinating role in the risk degree. For example,
an „SH high TU high” situation can create two types of
risks, namely „SH high TU high EH high” and „SH high
TU high EH low” where the latter has a lower risk than
the former, because the risk is always positively associated
with economic harm. The 8 categories can be arranged in
the following descending sequence according to the risk
degree: RI>RII>RIII>RIV>RV>RVI>RVII>RVIII (R stands
for the level of risk).
TABLE 1
Types of GM crop technology risks.
Risk I
SH high TU high EH high
Risk II
SH high TU high EH low
Risk III
SH high TU low EH high
Risk IV
SH high TU low EH low
Risk V
SH low TU high EH high
Risk VI
SH low TU high EH low
Risk VII
SH low TU low EH high
Risk VIII
SH low TU low EH low
Note: SH-social hazard, TH-technical uncertainty, EH-economic
harm
CHINA’S GM CROP TECHNOLOGY RISK
IN THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL
Risk analysis on the whole
Since the GM tomatoes were firstly commercialized
in US in 1994, the global commercialized plantation
areas of GM crops have been on the stable rise (see Figure
2) with mainly four types of crops: soybean (90mln ha or
77% of global production), corn (158mln ha or 26%),
cotton (33mln ha or 49%) and canola (31mln ha or 21%)
(ISAAA, 2009). Although China delays the plantation of
GM crops, its current development is very fast. By 2008,
there are seven kinds of domestic GM corps approved for
commercial production and 22 kinds of foreign GM
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Figure 1. Three dimensional-model of GM crop technology risk.
crops approved for import. Currently a small amount of
home-grown GM tomatoes are planted in Hubei and
Guangdong provinces, however the frutescens capsi-
cums are limited to Liaoning province (Xu et al., 2009).
Recently, although the plantation of Bt cottons grows
rapidly at an average rate of 70 percent a year (see Figure
3), about 70% GM seeds are provided by Monsanto.
Although the GM cottons are mainly used as a raw
material for textiles, many farmers in Hebei province of
China also have started to extract cooking oil from the
seed (Xu et al., 2009). If these GM plants contain any risk
material, this would lead to unexpected consequences,
such as social risk, technology risk and even economic
risk, for which the republic is unprepared. In the three-
-dimensional model, we argue that China’s GM crops
technology is at the high risk of high social hazard, high
technology uncertainty and high economic harm (see
Figure 1).
From a higher social hazard perspective, once GM food
becomes daily supply, it would be fatal if there is one risky
case happing such as cross-species infection, pathogen
drug-resistant or food toxicity. On the other hand, the
awareness about this issue is very weak in China (Huang
et al., 2006). The low awareness level not only causes weak
self-defense and social supervision power but also pro-
vides opportunities for international biological companies
to control China’s GM food. Most importantly, with its
large size irreversible social hazard can be produced if GM
technology is promoted in China without relevant go-
vernance and control. Examples include the allergic reac-
tion to Brazil’s soybeans in 1996 and 1998, the StarLink
corn incident when soybeans were polluted by GM corn
followed by the American Monarch butterfly incident in
1999, the 2001 Mexican corn gene pollution and the 2002
English experiment that caused the GM food DNA to
remain in human bodies (Jia, 2004).
The US attitude remains positive towards the techno-
logy maturity, but the EU does not support GM techno-
logy. The technological levels are various between diffe-
rent countries. This is because their different GM policies
reflect their public resistance to the technology and are
amplified in the public debate (Miller et al., 2008). More
specially, there are four stages of research in developed
countries: closed greenhouse, semi-closed greenhouse,
isolated and fully opened experimental field plots, and
every step has special requirements. However, in China,
research institutes conduct GM research in the labora-
tories most of which do not have closed or semi-closed
conditions and some do not even have the basic conditions
for such research (Zhou and Cui, 2006). In addition, GM
technology itself is uncertain all over the world. GM tech-
nologies may cause unintended non-target effects. Non-
-target effects include the influence on and interactions
with all organisms in the environment, including direct or
indirect effects. Direct effects concern ecotoxic effects on
other organisms, for instance larval feeding on insect-
-resistant plants (Obrycki et al., 2001), or effects on soil
organisms (Saxena and Stotzky, 2000). Indirect effects are
like consumer health, contamination of wild gene pools,
or alterations in ecological relationships.
The expansion of GM areas shows the fast marke-
tization of GM seeds. However, what is of concern is the
concentration of seeds within a handful of companies. In
2006 Monsanto, Pioneer Company, Syngenta and Bayer
accounted for 41% of the total global seed sales (Chen,
2010). The highly concentrated market of GM seeds
enhances the dependence of Chinese farmers and the
global agricultural system on multinational firms. This
has not only reduced the diversity of agricultural bio-
logical resources, but also intensifies the system risks for
agriculture, including market power, limiting R&D and
biological risks (Harhoff et al., 2001). Also, although
China has certain global competitiveness in biotechno-
logy, the GM technology intellectual rights are still far
behind developed countries. The monopoly of patent
technology has not only delivered low economic benefits
from GM technology, but has exposed the country’s
traditional agriculture to serious challenges.
Based on the three-dimensional model, the risk of
China’s GM crop development is high. The following
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Figure 2. The development of world GM crops.
Source: James et al. (2003) and ISAAA (2009).
Figure 3. The development of Bt cotton in China.
Source: James et al. (2003) and ISAAA (2009).
example of China’s soybean market is able to reflect the
potential social hazard and economic harm of China’s
GM crops more clearly.
The case of GM soybean market
According to Jiang (2012), the issues on GM tech-
nology are classified into 9 types (see Table 2) through
analyzing 107 samples selected from 1821 pieces of news
and articles from more than Chinese 500 newspapers in
2010. As it is illustrated in Table 2, the issues on foreign
GM soybean risk account 22.4 %, which ranks the second
in all issues. These results show that the risk of GM
soybean is an important issue. Hence we take China’s
soybean as a good example to demonstrate the potential
social and economic risks resulting from international
GM soybean trade.
In China the import of soybean increases rapidly from
only 1000 tons in 1990 to 30.8 million tons in 2007, while
the export has a slight decrease from 910 kilotons in 1999
to 456 kilotons in 2007 (see Table 3). There have been
three fast rising stages of net import on China’s soybean
since 1990. During the first stage in 1996, China’s
soybean market was just open for international markets,
and its import firstly exceeded the export. From then on,
the import of soybean has always been much greater than
the export. In 2001 with China’s accession to WTO, the
single low tariffs of soybean was set as 3%, which induced
the import to enter into the second fast increasing stage.
While in 2003 China’s soybean import stepped into the
third increasing stage with the growth rate of 83%. In
particular in 2002, the public announcement of tem-
porary measures on genetically modified food by China’s
Ministry of Agriculture suggests that foreign companies
can export GM products to China with their temporary
certificates. This policy facilitated the third quickly in-
creasing stage of China’s soybean import, and also
provided a significantly potential risk for China’s GM
crops. For example, between 2001 and 2008, China im-
ported 200mln tons of soybeans, however 70% of them
contain GM ingredients which are the major source for
cooking oil (Xu et al., 2009). If GM soybeans are harmful
for human health, they may also create serious social
problems.
In addition, China is the largest import country in the
international GM soybean market. However, the import
of China’s soybean is basically from several regular mu-
ltinational companies. For example, three countries, in-
cluding the United States, Brazil and Argentina, have
monopolized about 99 % of China’s GM soybean im-
ports (see Table 4), resulting in the pricing war in the
market of cooking oil supply chain which completely
depends on these three countries. In fact, the multi-
national corporations have taken many measures to ma-
nipulate China’s soybean market. For instance, in 2004
they came to an agreement to control the soybean future
trading price of Chicago, leading to the rapidly increas-
ing cost of China’s domestic soybean processing com-
panies. In that year about 50 % of China’s soybean pro-
cessing companies went bankrupt due to that agreement
which caused the direct economic loss of 8 billion yuan
(Deng, 2010).
Meanwhile the GM soybean import also changes the
trade patterns of China’s agricultural products from sur-
pluses to deficits (see Table 5). China’s soybean produc-
tion has decreased from 13.5 million tons in 1995 to 12.73
million tons in 2007, while the self-sufficiency ratio of
soybean has dropped from 101% to 29.5%. The depen-
dence of China soybean production has significantly ne-
gative effect on China’s self-sufficiency ratio of grain on
the whole, which decreases from 98.5% in 1995 to 95.7%
in 2007.
In summary, both the whole risk analysis and the GM
soybean risk analysis demonstrate that the risk of GM
crops in China is high. Particularly, the whole risk is
correlated with high social hazard, high technology un-
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TABLE 3
Volume change of China’s soybean export and import
between 1990 and 2007.
Year Export Import Net
export
Year Export Import Net
export
1990 91.0 0.1 90.9 1999 20.4 431.9 –411.5
1991 106.5 0.1 106.4 2000 21.1 1041.9 –1020.8
1992 84.5 12.1 72.4 2001 24.8 1394.0 –1369.2
1993 34.5 9.9 24.6 2002 27.6 1131.5 –1103.9
1994 92.7 5.2 87.5 2003 26.7 2074.1 –2047.4
1995 42.7 29.4 13.3 2004 33.4 2023.0 –1989.6
1996 19.2 110.8 –91.6 2005 39.6 2659.0 –2619.4
1997 18.6 287.6 –269.0 2006 37.9 2827.0 –2789.1
1998 17.0 319.3 –302.3 2007 45.6 3082.0 –3036.4
Notes: The unit is 10 thousand tons.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
(1991–2008) and Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic
TABLE 2






Recent progress of GM technology 9 8.4
Debate of GM cotton 7 6.5
Debate of staple foods 11 10.3
Debate of GM soybean 24 22.4
Attitudes toward GM crops 26 24.3
Consumer interest of GM crops 5 4.7
Laws and regulations on GM crops 4 3.7
Risk governance on GM crops 11 10.3
Others 10 9.3
Total 107 100
certainty and high economic harm in the three-dimen-
sional model. However the position of China’s GM crops
technology risk in the three dimensions is the outcome
from the game played by all actors in the fields of inte-
rests. In order to deal with the high risk of China’s GM
crop technology in the model, this study applies the
actor-networks theory to explore its risk governance
mechanisms.
RISK GOVERNANCE OF GM CROP
TECHNOLOGY WITH ACTOR-NETWORKS
Actor-Networks Theory is first proposed by French
sociological scholars to analyze the technology develop-
ment among different actors interactions in the 1980s
(Latour, 1987; Callon et al. 1986). It is a brand new basic
model of scientific activities during which actors attempt
to establish a long chain of allies through Concatenation
of Translation to form a seamless web constructed with
sciences, technologies, economies, nature and societies.
Among these chains, sponsors are always attempting to
realize their hub position as Obligatory Passage Point
(OPP). There are generally four steps during the Conca-
tenation of Translation between actors: Problematization,
interessement, enrollment and mobilization. Therefore
scientific research became an effective power during the
competition between alliances while the development of
technology is the result of the power. In brief, actor net-
works can reduce the risks in the society while providing a
platform for constructing the knowledge.
Actor-network and OPP analysis
The risk management of GM crop technology, to a
large extent, can be explored through the supervision of
actor networks. According to the actor-networks theory,
GM technology development is no longer to be regarded
as a mutual fragmented process between the natural
non-human actors and social human actors. Non-hu-
man actors translate their own benefits to the whole GM
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TABLE 4
Source structure of China’s soybean imports (1995-2007).
Year 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2007
Total import 29.4 110.8 1041.9 1393.8 1131.5 2074 2659 3082.1
America 14.4 86.0 541.4 572.6 461.9 829.3 1104.8 1157.1
Brazil 0.7 5.3 212 316 390.9 647 795.2 1058.3
Argentina 9.4 11.8 278.4 502.0 277.5 596.4 739.6 827.8
Others 4.9 7.7 10.1 3.2 1.2 1.3 19.4 38.9
Share of import (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
America 48.98 77.62 51.96 41.08 40.82 39.99 41.55 37.54
Brazil 2.38 4.78 20.34 22.67 34.55 31.2 29.91 34.34
Argentina 31.97 10.65 26.72 36.02 24.52 28.76 27.81 26.86
Others 16.67 6.95 0.97 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.73 1.26
Notes: The unit of import is 10 thousand tons and the data for 2006 is missing.
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (1991-2008) and Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China (1991–2008).
TABLE 5
Impacts of soybean trade on China’s farm products trade.
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Volume of soybean trade 8.6 9.5 23.3 28.9 25.6 55.1 71.2 79.5 76.4 116.7
Export 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.5 2.0
Import 8.0 8.9 22.7 28.1 24.8 54.2 69.8 77.8 74.9 114.7
Balance of Trade –7.4 –8.3 –22.1 –27.3 –24 –53.3 –68.4 –76.1 –73.4 –112.7
Volume of farm produce trade 221.3 216.3 268.2 279.0 305.8 403.6 514.2 558.3 634.8 781.0
Export 138.1 134.7 156.2 160.7 181.4 214.3 233.9 271.8 314 370.1
Import 83.2 81.6 112 118.3 124.4 189.3 280.3 286.5 320.8 410.9
Balance of Trade 54.9 53.1 44.2 42.4 57.0 25.0 –46.4 –14.7 –6.8 –40.8
Notes: The unit of import is 100 million in US dollar.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China (2008) and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (199–2008).
networks through Concatenation of Translation to un-
dertake the GM technology in the actor-networks
(Callon et al., 1986; Wang et al., 2009, Hong et al., 2010).
The risk governance structure of GM crop, especially for
China GM soybean, within the three-dimensional mo-
del involves governments, enterprises, R&D, internatio-
nal actors, the public and many other stakeholders. A
complex actor-network can be formed by these stake-
holders (see Figure 4) with actors including government
actors, economic actors, technology actors, social actors
and international actors. In figure 4, the government
actors are located in the center of the network, where
represents the Concatenation of Translation process of
the OPP and the central circle shows the encountered
problems during the risks management.
From the perspective of the OPP (i.e. Chinese govern-
ment), it includes state food and drug supervision bu-
reaus, ministry of science and technology, agricultural
department, health department, national environmental
protection bureau, ministry of commerce, education de-
partment and intellectual property bureau etc. Through
formulating proper evaluation documents of GM tech-
nology development, government regulators will achieve
their concatenation of translation in their 'actor-network'
and activate various actors of China’s GM technology risk
governance while achieving their strategic position of the
OPP to incorporate other actors into the dynamic and
heterogeneous network governance to achieve the risks
management of GM technology under the three-dimen-
sional model. The key of GM risk management from the
perspective of actor-network is how the government ac-
tors, who are in the OPP, achieve the balance of interest
between the GM actors during the translation process and
then change the risks pattern in the three-dimensional
model. For instance Chinese government can change the
patter of current China GM crop risk from type I to type II
by lowering the economic risk in the three-dimensional
model. The risk also can be changed from type I to type III
by increasing R&D investment on GM technology to de-
crease its technology uncertainty.
From the perspective of the technology actors, they
need to receive financial support from government and
enterprise actors, but on the other hand they should
promote the degree of GM technology maturity to ensure
the safety of GM food. For example, a technological actor
was formed by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and
the GM technology R&D institutes of several universities
to jointly manage risks. After the GM crops are approved
to be allowed in the market, economic actors (such as
farmers, manufacturers, distributers and retailers) start to
plant, produce and sell GM products. Driven by op-
portunism, the first purpose of the economic actors is to
benefit as much as possible from the process of environ-
mental release of the technology for commercialization.
However, these self-driven interests are exposed to pres-
sures from consumers, social media and government
regulatory authorities and are constrained by environ-
mental management costs. The social actors mainly com-
posed of consumers, social media and environmental
NGOs are the direct GM crops and risks monitors. They
are able to effectively monitor the GM technology risks,
but firstly they need to properly understand the cha-
racteristics of the lifecycle of GM technology and the
level of social hazard, technology uncertainty and eco-
nomic harm in its different stages. Finally, the main
international actors, such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), World Bank and biological multinational
companies will also greatly influence the risks mana-
gement. For example, WTO is responsible for the in-
ternational trade coordination for GM foods; however
the biological multinational companies to a great extent
have been controlling the intellectual property system of
Chinese GM seeds.
Concatenation of Translation analysis
Through the analysis of the actors in Chinese GM
crop technology risks management as well as the exami-
nation of the OPP, it can be inferred that the evolution of
actor-networks has its own regularity and convertibility
of the government actors’ OPP. During the evolution of
the actor- networks of the dynamic and heterogeneous
GM crop technology, Chinese government actors will
translate imbalanced interests of risks management to
balanced common interests of all actors and form a com-
plex network of risks management. These networks in-
clude not only governmental, social, technological, eco-
nomic and international actors (as shown in Figure 4)
but also the sub-networks associated within all actors.
Figure 4 shows that in the Chinese GM actor-network
the core of management with the OPP is to achieve a
balance of network benefits through the process of Con-
catenation of Translation, which can be divided into 4
stages:
(1) In the stage of Problematization, every actor is
involved by the OPP to work out how to effectively
control the GM crop technology risks triggered by high
social hazard, high-technology uncertainty and high
economic harm. These risks will not be naturally con-
trolled and they need the participation and cooperation
among all actors. However whether actors can volun-
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Figure 4. Risk governance of GM crop technology in actor. network.
tarily participate in risk governance depends on how they
estimate any benefits and risks. When the risk mana-
gement costs for GM technology are greater than the
benefits, the actors tend to give up their management
plans which could result in an unstable actor-network.
(2) In order to manage the risks successfully, Chinese
government actors should achieve the network stability
and solidification through the interessement step of the
Concatenation Translation of benefit rights process.
Throughout the process of formation, development, sta-
bility and solidification, the network of a particular actor
depends on how the key point strengthens other actors’
role and status during the process of problematization in
order to establish a new alliance system while breaking
their potential competitive alliances on GM technology.
(3) The enrollment of stakeholders involves public sup-
port for the GM technology. During the process of inte-
ressement, in response to public opposition against GM
foods due to lack, insufficient or negative information about
safety, Chinese government’s role is to react to public
concerns and social awareness. A strict GM auditing system
can make scientific research more socially responsible in
laboratories and relate to the broader interests within so-
ciety. This can further improve the certainty of the techno-
logy in order to lower the risk probability or reject the de-
velopment of the GM technology. In consideration to
economic actors and the opportunism of multinational
companies, Chinese government should emphasize envi-
ronmental management and the indirect benefit transfor-
mation costs to achieve effective risk management allian-
ces, particularly on GM soybean international market.
(4) The mobilization stage will depend on the outco-
mes from the previous three stages and will respond both
to any scientific evidence and broader social attitudes to-
wards GM crop technology.
International biological and biotechnology multina-
tional companies can be unscrupulous in inputting pro-
ducts with GM ingredients on the Chinese market. They
also control China’s GM seeds and related patents which
will influence badly the translation of international actors’
benefits to Chinese actors’ benefits. Chinese government
actors should enhance the publicity and education in GM
technology while improving the GM legislation and
strengthening the communication and cooperation be-
tween actors. On the other hand, the government actors
must emphasize the risks management costs (or environ-
mental costs) of the economic actors during any produc-
tion of GM food. The government also needs to increase
R&D capabilities and direct technology actors in the deve-
lopment of GM crop technology in order to protect China’s
independent intellectual rights and reduce the monopoly
of GM crops and seeds by international multinational
companies. In fact, only the government actors can address
the obstacles and problems with a technology that is still at
an early stage of development. Finally, the government,
under the mobilization process, will become the voice for
social, economic, technological and international actors
and ultimately be responsible for risks management.
CONCLUSION
The GM crop technology is a very controversial issue.
While many parts of the world are strongly objecting and
banning its use, others are leaving its fields and markets
unprotected and open to be controlled by ambitious
profit-seeking and powerful multinational companies.
Which way a country will go depends on policy makers
and the legislation they approve. This is, however, not a
simple process. The analysis in this paper showed that
there are different types and levels of risk associated with
the GM technology as well as different actors influencing
the developments in the field. China is currently located in
the high-risk zone of the developed three-dimensional
model, where the high risk associated with the potential
high social hazard, high technology uncertainty and high
economic harm shows the urgency for better governance.
The Chinese Government needs to have a policy
system in place that will allow to properly balance the
opportunities and risks associated with the GM crop
technology. Is it a wise option to completely give up GM
R&D research? What the actors embedded by interests in
this issue need to do is know how to improve the ability of
risks management. There is a big gap between China’s
GM technology level and the world’s most advanced
achievements. There is also the threat from international
actors to prevent China’s GM independent. China needs
the R&D capabilities not to be left behind in the global
food race.
However, it is important for the Chinese government to
have a system in place that optimizes and promotes the
balance of risks/benefits from GM crops. System supply
and optimization are effective solutions for the negative
externalities of GM technology. This includes a risk
assessment system for GM crop technology, GM products
R&D approval system, environmental impacts assessment
system, a comprehensive reporting system for tracking and
monitoring GM agricultural production, processing,
operation, import and export activities, text and graphics
identification management system. Improvement in the
management system and security measures will help
achieve a balanced network of benefits to maximize the
control of GM technology risks.
Finally, it is vital for the Chinese government to streng-
then the communication and cooperation between be-
neficial bodies and to achieve the actors’ networked com-
prehensive management. They are essential for the
government to translate the management benefits of GM
technology risks into the self-interests of each actor. Co-
operation is necessary within the networks of main bodies
of actors and each actor should be treated as having an
international background, hence there is a need to have
international communication and cooperation. In addi-
tion, each actor in China should learn the lessons from the
industrialization of the American GM food production
and should mirror the European Union’s integrity and
risk management of food security in order to achieve the
required risks management during the network evolution.
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